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Abstract 
This paper builds on post-Keynesian macroeconomics, the French Regulation Theory and a 
Neo-Gramscian International Political Economy approach to class analysis to propose an 
International post-Keynesian Political Economy approach that is used to offer an empirical 
analysis of European growth models and working class restructuring in Europe between 2000 
and 2008. We will distinguish between the ‘East’, the ‘North’, and the ‘South’ and structure 
our analysis around industrial upgrading, financialisation and working class coherence. We 
find an export-driven growth model in the North, which came with wage suppression and 
outsourcing to the East. In the East the growth model can be characterised as dependent 
upgrading, which allowed for high real wage growth despite declining working class 
coherence. The South experienced a debt-driven growth model with a real estate bubble and 
high inflation rates resulting in large current account deficits. Our analysis shows that class 
restructuring forms an integral part in the economic process that resulted in European 
imbalances and the Euro crisis. 
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European growth models and working 
class restructuring. An International 
post-Keynesian Political Economy 
perspective 
 
1 Introduction 
European countries have had quite different crises. While the Greek economy descended into 
depression, and Spain and Italy are struggling to get out of recession, Austria and Germany had short 
sharp recessions followed by recovery. Germany’s unemployment rate is below that of 2007, 
whereas Spain and Greece have unemployment rates well above 20%. Today divergence is obvious. 
In contrast, the decade before the crisis is often regarded as one of convergence among European 
economies (European Commission 2008). This paper questions this view. We argue, firstly, that 
European growth models had been on different trajectories in the decade before the crisis and we 
identify three models. Second, we argue that these growth models were intimately linked with 
different forms of working class restructuring.  
Diverging dynamics in Europe prior to the crisis was pointed out in the literature, based on a 
distinction between debt-driven and export-driven growth models (Hein, 2013; Heyes et al. 2012, 
Stockhammer, 2011b, 2016b), a subordinated integration of the Eastern periphery (Bohle, and 
Greskovits, 2012; Nölke and Vliegenhart, 2009) or resulting from diverse specialization paths 
between North and South (Boyer, 2013). The contribution of this paper is, first, that it outlines an 
International post-Keynesian Political Economy (IPKPE) approach. We build on post-Keynesian (PK) 
macroeconomics, neo-Gramscian notions of class struggle and hegemony and the idea of 
interdependent transnational and international accumulation dynamics derived from International 
Political Economy and economic geography. Second, the paper then offers an empirical analysis of 
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the articulation of European growth models in the decade preceding the crisis. This analysis allows 
for different working class experiences in different country groups. We highlight that nation states 
are themselves structured along class lines and that class struggles are integral part of the processes 
that led to European imbalances. These struggles do take place locally and thus will take different 
forms, which will be shaped by the position and trajectory of a country in the international division 
of labour and the differential transformations of the capitalist economies, in particular the process 
of financialisation has had different impacts in different countries.  
The paper thus asks two sets of questions. First, what have been the pattern and drivers of European 
growth models? And secondly, how are these growth models reflected in the changes in working 
class coherence? We use the term working class coherence to denote the unity and organisational 
ability of the working classes to assert their (economic) interests. We will distinguish three country 
groups. We argue that export orientation in the ‘North’ came with a retreat of the working class, 
which is reflected in weak real wage growth, increasing wage dispersion and union decline and a 
heavy reliance on outsourcing to the eastern periphery. In the ‘East’, the catching up process driven 
by dependent integration into global value chains has allowed high real wage growth, while other 
indicators show that working class coherence has suffered. Wage dispersion has widened and there 
has been a strong decline in union density. Catching up has allowed for rapid real wage growth 
despite a disintegration of working class coherence. In the ‘South’ the debt-driven boom has come 
with moderate increases in real wages, a stable wage dispersion and comparatively moderate 
decline in union density. This was a regime of an implicit social compromise, which was economically 
based on a bubble, but which differs from the Anglo-Saxon experience of the financial bubble, which 
came with a deterioration of working class coherence. We systematically compare several countries 
for each group by using indicators for the three dimensions financialisation, industrial upgrading and 
working class coherence. 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the contributions of economic geography and 
the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach. Section 3 discusses PKE, neo-Gramscian International 
Political Economy (NGIPE) and the French Regulation Theory (FRT) and how we combine them into 
an IPKPE approach. Section 4 presents a stylized description of the growth models of the North, East 
and West and their interrelations. Section 5 operationalises the concepts working class coherence, 
financialisation, and industrial upgrading and explain how they will be measured. The empirical 
analysis for these dimensions is presented in section 6. Section 7 discusses of working class 
restructuring in the three growth models and characterizes the hegemonic regime. Finally section 8 
concludes. 
 
2. Economic geography and Varieties of Capitalism on European 
integration 
Debates about European convergence and monetary integration in economic geography have been 
framed by the theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA). OCA analyses the conditions under which a 
set of regions can be considered an OCA assuming asymmetric exogenous shocks. The relevant 
conditions include labour mobility and similar industrial structure and the regions that form the Euro 
area are not fulfilling these. New Economic Geography adds that regional specialization can lead to 
economies of scale that will result in (regional) divergence. Against these analyses, the endogenous 
OCA theory (e.g. De Grauwe and Mongelli 2005) argues that monetary union itself would create the 
conditions for OCA and thus predicts convergence. 
This prediction has been discussed empirically. Fingleton et al. (2015) present a careful analysis of 
convergence and divergence (of employment rates) of European regions before and after 2008. They 
conclude that while there was weak convergence prior to the crisis there has been a pronounced 
divergence since the crisis. Martin’s (2001) study on the 1975-1998 period finds weak evidence of 
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convergence of regional output. Rodriguez-Pose (1999) reports some evidence of convergence (for 
the period 1977-93) but argues that national units do not play a key role in explaining economic 
performance. Rather a region‘s characteristics critically influence its growth trajectory. In contrast, 
Fingleton et al (2015) shows that divergence dynamics (since 2008) clearly follow national pattern 
and closely match the countries in our North and South group.  
Overcoming the OCA approach’s emphasis on exogenous shocks, economic geography offers a rich 
account of super and sub-national forces in economic and social development that can lead to 
divergence. However, it downplays the national scale and thereby runs the danger of losing sight of 
key macroeconomic mechanisms: socio-political compromises crystallise in national institutions that 
underpin demand formation regimes and idiosyncratic configurations of the financial and the 
productive systems.   
In contrast to economic geography, the VoC approach emphasizes the institutional features of 
capitalist economies and their complementarities at the national level. VoC takes a relational view of 
the firm, where the skills, pay and motivation of workers as well as financial relations play an 
important role. It stresses the institutional functionality of corporate governance structures, labour 
relations, education and financial systems (Hall and Soskice 2001, Hancké et al 2007) in creating 
incentives and constraints for firms. The distinction between liberal and coordinated market 
economies has become a hallmark of the approach, but it has been extended to include 
Mediterranean or mixed market economies (Amable 2003, Hassel 2014) and, borrowing some 
insights from NGIPE, dependent market economies for Central Eastern European countries (Nölke 
and Vliegenthart 2009).  
VoC proponents analyse the developments in Europe leading up to the crisis as the result of the 
interaction of the core countries with coordinated wage bargaining and the periphery countries with 
weak bargaining coordination in a fixed exchange rate regime without central (European) fiscal 
policy (Johnston et al 2013, Hall 2014, see Nölke 2014 as a survey). The loss of competitiveness of 
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the periphery is explained as the result of lack of wage restraint in the non-tradeable sectors among 
which the public sector wages are singled out as the main culprit. Current account imbalances are 
analysed as result of cost differences and there is little concern for financialisation. 
VoC has been criticized for overemphasising the functionality and the stability of the regimes (Hay, 
2005, Peck and Theodore 2007, Heyes et al 2012, Streeck 2012). We share these criticisms. VoC puts 
competitiveness at the core of its analysis of institutions, where we highlight class compromises at 
its basis. VoC has a strong focus on supply-side factors, albeit in a much richer form than mainstream 
economics, but has no systematic analysis of demand formation. Peck and Theodore (2007) 
conclude their critique of the VoC approach by saying “...what we are lacking, (…), are institutional 
theories of uneven development of capitalism. We (…) might find them in some form of three way 
marriage between neo-Marxist concepts of combined and uneven development, regulationist 
treatments of the geographies of accumulation and regulation, and Polanyan (rather than 
Granovetterian) notions of socio-institutional embeddedness” (Peck and Theodore, 2007, p. 762). 
This paper puts forward an account of the decade prior to the crisis by proposing a new theoretical 
framework that suggests a solution to Peck and Theodore’s challenge by highlighting the role of 
working class restructuring, demand formation and financialisation.  
3. Toward an International post-Keynesian Political Economy  
We build on Post-Keynesian Economics (PKE), FRT, NGIPE, and economic geography to offer an IPKPE 
to analyse national growth models based on a demand analysis, how they interact and complement 
each other productively and financially and what social compromises and power balances they are 
based on. Through an original combination of their respective achievements, it helps to overcome 
the weaknesses of each of these approaches. Let us consider out building blocks in turn.  
PKE is a non-mainstream economic approach that gives central role to the principle of effective 
demand, fundamental uncertainty and social conflict (Lavoie 2009, King 2002). Its macroeconomic 
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analysis is premised on a class division, but PKE does not provide a framework for the analysis of 
class relations. Rather it focuses on the economic outcomes of changing class relations. Post 
Keynesians have long criticised the macroeconomic policy regime of the European Union. They have 
highlighted that reliance on wage flexibility will not be sufficient for adjustment and indeed wage 
flexibility can be destabilising.  
The interaction of income distribution and demand formation features prominently in PKE, which 
distinguishes between wage-led and profit-led demand regimes (Bhaduri and Marglin 1990). As 
regards the actual growth drivers under neoliberalism, Hein (2013) and Stockhammer (2011, 2016b) 
identify debt-driven and export-driven growth models. Both highlight the deflationary bias of the 
European economic policy package and recommend ECB backing for member states public debt, 
expansionary fiscal policy and sustained wage growth; both do not analyse the implications of the 
growth models for working class restructuring and they do not include Eastern European countries in 
their analysis. 
The French Regulation Theory proposes an historical and institutional macroeconomic analysis. It 
stresses that macroeconomic dynamics (accumulation regimes) are shaped by institutional 
arrangements produced by social balance of power and material force of ideas. The mode of 
regulation, in FRT’s classical version, consists of labour relations, competitive relations, the monetary 
regime, the forms of state intervention and the insertion to the international regime. Boyer (2000) 
allows for a changing hierarchy of institutional forms accompanying EU integration. While labour 
relations were dominant during the Fordist period, afterwards competition and money have taken 
dominance. This fuels disruptive dynamics between socioeconomic demands raised by national 
democratic polity and technocratic supranational settings at the EU level (Durand and Keucheyan, 
2015) resulting in a rising polarisation between a highly competitive northern Europe which was able 
to maintain a strong manufacturing export basis and a South specialized in domestic services (Boyer, 
2013). One key manifestation of these discordant modes of regulation between southern and 
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northern countries is a misalignment of real exchange rates in the Euro’s fixed (nominal) exchange 
rate system (Duwicquet, Mazier, and Saadaoui, 2012). The overvaluation of most of the South and 
the undervaluation of the North led to considerable ‘implicit transfers’ from the former to the latter 
(Mazier and Petit, 2013). Overall, for FRT the inability of European integration to cope with the 
north-south divide in terms of competitiveness and the vanishing of the monetary adjustment 
mechanisms fuelled the euro crisis and revealed the fragility of the European polity.  
Neo-Gramscian International Political Economy combines a concern for class struggles and the 
establishment of hegemony within the nation state with an interest in international relations shaped 
by power relations. NGIPE has posited the emergence of a transnational ruling class and analysed 
class interests in European integration, notably in the context of the post-socialist transformation 
(Bohle and Greskovits, 2007, 2012). Becker and Jäger (2012) inspired by NGIPE and the original 
Marxist roots of FRT analyse the interaction of European capitalisms and their regulation at different 
spatial scales. While their work deals in large part with the aftermath of the crisis and lacks a 
quantitative empirical analysis, they emphasise uneven economic development trajectories and 
distinguish between the core of Europe, which is characterised by active extraversion and productive 
accumulation, and the peripheral countries, which has passive extraversion and financial 
accumulation, without distinguishing between the eastern and southern periphery.  
Our IPKPE approach takes from PKE its analysis of demand regimes and of the role of finance and 
debt. However, PKE lacks a theory of the state and while it is based on class analysis, it has a narrow 
concept of class conflict. Moreover, most of its analyses treat national economies in isolation. We 
draw on the insight of FRT important works from the 1970s and 80s as they offered an 
understanding of institutions based on social compromises as the source of macroeconomic 
regularities, but depart from their mostly nation state-centric perspective. Finally, we are very close 
to the ambitions of NGIPE and variegated capitalism framework. These approaches have furthered 
our understanding of the conflictive nature of capitalist economies and taken into account social 
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forces within nation states as well as international interdependencies. However they have so far 
failed to propose an operationalisation at the macro-economic level that would allow to empirically 
analyse the economic and social mechanisms that it has theorised and explain the pattern of 
demand formation, which is a central feature of the framework we proposed. Recently the term 
variegated capitalism has been used to formulate an ambitious research program that builds on 
Marxist theory, FRT and NGIPE (Peck and Theodore 2007, Brenner et al 2010, Jessop 2011), but 
there are as of yet few empirical applications of this approach (see Heyes et al 2012). Our approach 
is thus fully consistent with a notion of variegated capitalism, but we have stronger concern for the 
pattern of demand formation. 
Our aim in the remainder of this paper is to apply this framework to a historically specific case, the 
decade before the crisis in Europe. We discuss the trajectories of different country groupings in the 
period of neoliberalisation in the early 2000s when western European countries established a single 
currency and eastern countries emerged out of the institutional shake-up of the post-soviet 
transformation. In doing so, we want to analyse the interaction of macroeconomic dynamics with 
changes in working class coherence. Unlike VoC we do not aim to establish a general typology of 
capitalist economies, but rather describe in the FRT spirit historically specific development 
trajectories. Our project is ambitious in that we try to combine a macroeconomic comparative 
analysis that takes into account demand formation as well as supply side (production) concerns with 
an analysis of class restructuring. As the pattern of capital accumulation changes, so will typically the 
structure of the working class, partly as the result, partly as the cause.  
4. Neoliberalism and growth models in Europe: A stylised story of the 
East, North and South during the pre-crisis boom (ca 2000-2008)  
Neoliberalism brought about a rise in inequality, financialisation, globalisation and privatisation (e.g. 
Harvey 2005). Our analysis focuses on the first two aspects. Rising inequality has taken the form of 
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an increase in top incomes (Atkinson et al. 2011) and a fall in the wage share (Stockhammer 2016a). 
It is based on welfare state retrenchment, globalisation and financialisation and reflects a shift in the 
power relations between capital and labour. Financialisation has affected financial institutions as 
well as households (e.g. through rising household debt), and firms (e.g. shareholder value 
orientation). However, the specific modalities of its implementation, its relation to existing social 
structures and the asymmetric international economic positions mean that neoliberalisation can 
have different outcomes (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002).  
With respect to its macro-economic dynamics, neoliberalism has fuelled debt-driven as well as an 
export-driven growth models. Both growth models are unsustainable: they rely on increasing debt 
ratios. In the debt-driven case this is domestic household debt; in the export-driven case it is 
external debt of the trade partners (Stockhammer 2011, Hein 2013). The two growth models are 
complementary as the export-driven model relies on trade partners with current account deficits. 
The debt-driven model is facilitated by capital inflows. This analysis only covers what we call the 
North and South. We extend this analysis to include the East. 
Figure 1 gives a stylized depiction of the key features and the interaction of growth regimes and 
working class restructuring in the East, the North and the South in Europe. Post-socialist 
transformation in the East was a large scale restructuring of social relation. It involved privatizations 
on an unprecedented scale (Drahokoupil and Myant, 2011), which allowed for a process of primitive 
accumulation in which former regime technocrats and foreign corporations benefited from the 
political release of assets. It also created a huge pool of cheap labour as workers lost the job security 
they enjoyed in the former Soviet. In central Eastern Europe foreign capital played a key role by 
outsourcing elements of the value chain. In particular, important parts of the German automotive 
industry now rely on inputs from Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. According to 
Drahokoupil and Myant (2015), these countries are part of a group of FDI-based Market economies 
characterized by their integration in the European Union and exports structures built around 
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manufactured goods produced by foreign-owned multinational corporations. Overall, the export-
industrialising economies of Central Eastern Europe experimented a subordinate integration into 
global value chains (GVC) allowed to consolidate (a moderate) industrial sector. King and Szelényi 
(2005) have called this ‘capitalism from without’. Shields (2012) stresses the active role of the 
domestic state and national social forces in endorsing economic – but also political and cultural – 
internationalization, propelling the hegemony of an emerging transnational capitalist class.  
  
 
Figure 1: Key features and interactions of growth regimes and working class restructuring in the East, the North and the 
South in Europe 
Note: GVC: global value chains 
The North experienced a real devaluation as prices and unit labour costs were growing more slowly 
than the EU average. This was, at least in part, the result of two strategies of northern capital. First, 
there was wage suppression in the North. German wages have in real terms stagnated in the decade 
prior to the crisis. Through a series of welfare reforms, the so-called Hartz reforms, Germany has 
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created a low wage sector (Giannelli and al., 2013). In labour relations, there was an erosion of 
collective bargaining (Dustmann et al., 2014). Starting from a high coverage of collective bargaining 
agreements, this coverage has declined sharply as capitalists increasingly opted out of collective 
bargaining. In addition firm-level modifications of sectoral wage agreements and concession 
bargaining have contributed to low wage growth and to the emergence of a segmented labour 
market. These developments are closely linked to German unification as capitalists in Eastern 
Germany did not have the corporatist traditions and increasingly opted out of employer federation 
membership and thus of collective bargaining agreements. Second, German capital expanded by 
outsourcing elements of the value chain. Important parts of the German automotive industry now 
rely on inputs from Eastern Europe, which put a downward pressure on domestic wages. These 
developments resulted in sluggish domestic demand and an increasingly export-oriented growth 
model. 
The South experienced a property and financial bubble fuelled by rapid credit growth which were 
made possible by financial liberalisation and low real interest rates related to the introduction of the 
Euro. This has come in some cases with an economic boom (Spain and Ireland had above average 
growth rates, but Portugal and Italy average ones) and, in all cases, with high inflation rates. 
Competitiveness decreased, the industrial sector was squeezed and large current account deficits 
resulted. At the same time the South had massive capital inflows that helped sustain (or ignite) the 
bubble and support domestic consumption growth. Budgetary conditions were rather relaxed and 
most Southern countries expanded the welfare state. Class struggle was partially suspended by 
welfare state expansion and an economic boom driven by non-tradable sectors. The working class 
was restructured: moderate, but non-trivial wage increases despite deindustrialisation and an 
increasing financialisation of households (the levels of household debt started at very low levels and 
increased massively).  
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Capital inflows have to be equal to the current account deficit (for each country). The direction of 
causality can go either way: trade surpluses (of the North) could have driven the process with 
surpluses being transferred to the South to finance their imports. But one can equally argue that 
property bubbles and strong growth in the South attracted capital inflows and enabled the export 
surpluses of the North. Similarly one could think about the East as largely being shaped by the 
strategies of northern multinationals; or one could locate the source of European dynamics in the 
vast expansion of the industrial reserve army that eastern European transformation meant for 
European capital. Our analysis does not privilege any specific causal chain, but highlights the 
interrelatedness of domestic processes within a structured international system.  
The first important fact highlighted by our analysis is that class restructuring played a part in the 
economic process that resulted in European imbalances. Our second key finding is that class struggle 
has proceeded very differently in the different blocks in Europe. There has been no convergence in 
class struggles. This de-synchronisation of class struggles of Europe may help understand why it is so 
difficult to develop a progressive working-class vision for Europe.  
 
5. Operationalising our categories 
In order to map the transformation of capitalist societies and economies in the decade prior to the 
crisis we analyse changes in three dimensions: working class coherence, financialisation and 
industrial upgrading. These dimensions are understood to be an integral part of the mode of 
regulation of an accumulation process. Working class coherence and financialisation are close 
relatives to categories of the FRT, which identifies the labor-capital nexus and the monetary regime. 
All growth models will register changes in all three dimensions, but one of the premises of our 
research is that different growth models may have been the main driver of transformations in one of 
the dimensions. For the decade before the crisis we hypothesise that working class restructuring was 
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key in the North, dependent industrial upgrading in the East and financialisation in the South. 
However, a detailed analysis of the feedbacks from changes in one dimension to another, the 
identification of the main driver of changes and the articulation of different growth models is not the 
main subject of this paper.  
We use the term working class coherence to denote the unity and organisational ability of the 
working classes to assert its (economic) interests. 1 Our empirical measures describe the relative 
development of living conditions of the working classes. We will measure this by the growth of real 
and nominal wages. The dispersion of wages is used as a measure of the degree of division and 
segmentation of the working class. The strength of the welfare state is measured by the share of 
social expenditures relative to GDP; it measures the extent to which the reproduction of the working 
class is supported by the state. Finally, we use the organisational density of labour unions as a 
measure for the organisational strength of the labour movement. Our concept of working class 
coherence thus is close to the Regulationist analysis of the wage labour nexus, which is typically 
concerned with the extent of productivity indexation of wages, the extent of collective bargaining 
and the control regime at the workplace. However, our approach differs in that we offer more 
dimensions and that we have a greater concern for working class segmentation (see Gordon, 
Edwards and Reich 1982 for a seminal analysis of the role of segmentation in the USA).  
Financialisation refers to the rise of financial claims and incomes relatively to the size of the real 
sector. Financialisation has affected non-financial business, the financial sector and households in 
different ways. Our aim is not a comprehensive description of these phenomena, but an analysis of 
the decade prior to the crisis. In this period the financialisation of households has played the most 
important role. Domestic credit (and in particular its growth in recent years) has been driven by 
                                                          
 
1
 Our analysis remains mostly at the level of economic variables, but ideally we would like to measure socio-
political dimensions of working class coherence. 
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mortgage credit, not credit to businesses, and securitisation has played a minor role compared to 
the US experience. We are specifically concerned with the impact on demand formation, particular 
and the extent to which it has allowed for a debt-driven consumption growth model. Thus our 
analysis of financialisation focuses on household debt and property prices. We will measure this by 
the debt-to-income ratio for households, by real property prices (i.e. property prices relative to 
consumer prices) and real share prices.2 The key variable for our purposes is the level and change in 
household debt. This is measured relative to income and indicates the extent of financialisation of 
households. The key variable determining changes in household debt is property prices. We also 
look at a broader measure of credit growth, which is private credit growth. This includes credit to 
firms. In the relevant period business debt has had moderate rates of increase. Real stock prices are 
a measure of financial asset prices. Finally, we report the net international investment position (NIIP) 
as measure of the financial position of the country vis à vis the rest of the world. Financialisation as 
used here has some overlaps with the Regulationist concept of the monetary regime, which depicts 
the forms of money creation and financing of the economy and how they impact upon the economy.  
We use the category industrial upgrading to describe the extent and nature of industrial formation 
of the economy. Thus this includes the rate of growth of productivity as well as the extent to which it 
is driven by external factors and what its position within a given international division of labour is. 
This will be proxied by the growth of labour productivity, the share of manufacturing in value added 
and the inward FDI stock. With all our variables we are primarily interested in the medium term 
changes. The discussion of the different levels for each of the variables would be interesting in their 
                                                          
 
2
 A more comprehensive measure of financialisation would include the effects on non-financial business 
(shareholder value orientation etc). Stock market capitalisation is often used as a measure of market-based 
financial systems and interpreted as ‘sources of business finance’ (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009, p. 681). This is 
misleading because stock markets today are mostly about secondary trading and share issues are not an 
important source of business finance (Schaberg 1999). The econometric evidence indicates that investment 
hardly reacts to equity prices (e.g. Stockhammer and Wildauer 2015).  
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own right, but beyond the scope of this paper. This category cuts across some Regulationist 
categories as it includes elements of what the FRT calls the technological paradigm as well as 
elements of what it discusses under insertion into the international regime.  
We will group countries in the North, the South and the East. The North will be Germany (DEU), 
Austria (AUT) and the Netherlands (NLD). These are countries of the Germanic block within the Euro 
area. They share a similar structure in labour relations, a comparatively developed welfare state and 
a strong industrial sector. The South will consist of Greece (GRE), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Portugal 
(PRT) and Spain (ESP). These are the peripheral countries within the Euro area that were hit hard by 
the crisis. Their industrial base is weaker, but in many cases has improved over the past decades. The 
East consists of Poland (POL), the Czech Republic (CZE), Slovakia (SVK), Hungary (HUN) and Slovenia 
(SVN). These are post-communist economies that had a relatively strong industrial base, but have 
only integrated into the capitalist world economy in the 1990s. They have historically strong welfare 
states that have been restructured and weak labour relations. 
The grouping of the countries is motivated by an understanding of European economic relations as 
encompassing economies with quite different economic developments that may have a differential 
experience of processes like globalisation, financialisation or European monetary integration. In 
particular we hypothesise that there are at least two peripheral models. Our grouping of countries is 
intended to be useful and serves the purpose of illustration. There are several potential issues. First, 
the delineation of groups is arbitrary at the border. We include the Euro area export-oriented 
countries, but could also have included non-Euro area countries (Denmark, Sweden). The North has 
one member of paramount importance: Germany. One could argue that the North ultimately is 
Germany. We prefer to use a small group for the North in order to not dilute Germany’s contribution 
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to the average data of the group.3 Within this group, the Netherlands are an interesting 
intermediate case that has elements of an export-driven as well as of a debt-driven economy. As 
regards the South, the question is whether Italy should be included or not. For the East we decide to 
distinguish what is essentially the Visegrad group of countries. One could add another group of 
Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic countries. All these are issues of implementing our grouping.  
The country groupings are based on our explanation of the socio-economic trajectories in the 
decade before the crisis. They are very similar to those offered by the recent VoC literature. Amable 
(2003) and Hassel (2014) extend the basic coordinated and liberal market economy groups by a 
Mediterranean or Mixed Market group, which is almost identical to our South, and Nolke and 
Vliegenthart (2009) use Dependent Market Economy group, which corresponds to our East. The 
motivation for the country groups, however, is different. While VoC offers a general classification of 
models of capitalism our analysis offers a historically specific group based on our analysis of the 
dynamics of financialisation, working class restructuring and dependent upgrading.4 
A final issue are countries that do not fit our categorisation. The most important case among these is 
France, which would occupy an intermediate position (Hein 2012 classifies France as ‘domestic 
demand led regime’). The UK we would include in a distinct group of Anglo-Saxon counties 
(characterised by a high level of development and a strong financialisation experience).  
 
                                                          
 
3
 Another possible strategy to deal with this would be to include a larger group of countries and use GDP-
weighted averages.  
4
 Ireland is sometimes classified as a liberal market economy by VoC (e.g. Hassel 2014). Amable (2003) 
classifies Ireland as part Continental European Capitalism, which corresponds to the coordinated model. We 
argue that it better fits into the southern group as its increase in household debt is much higher than that of 
the USA and UK, whereas its increase in inequality is substantially lower. 
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6. Financialisation, industrial upgrading and working class coherence, 
in the North, South and East  
 
6.1. Financialisation 
We cover the period before the crisis, which will refer to the period 2000-08 unless noted otherwise. 
Table 1 summarises the different development of financialisation in Europe. Household debt as 
percentage of GDP increased 9.7%-pts in the North, 20.3%-pts in the East and by a staggering 45.9%-
pts in the South. Household debt is to a large extent driven by house prices. These grew by 2.1% in 
real terms in the North, but 41.7% in the South. Within the group of the North the Netherlands 
experienced a steep increase in house prices and of household debt while Germany had both 
declining house prices and falling household debt. The picture within the southern countries is more 
uniform. Spain and Ireland stand out with explosive increases in debt and house prices. Data on 
house prices are not available for all countries, in particular not for our eastern group. Private credit 
in % of GDP was subject to a moderate increase in the North, a very high increase in the South and a 
small increase in the East. The growth in equity prices is given for the period 2000 to 2007 because 
(unlike most other data we discuss in this paper) they start to decline already in 2008 and we wish to 
analyse the boom. We use 2007 as the base year for the calculation of growth rates.5 They rose by 
5% in northern countries and 0% in southern countries. The countries in the East experienced a stock 
market boom with an increase of 66% (with the Slovak Republic and Slovenia as the main drivers). 
The net international investment position (NIIP) represents the difference between a country’s 
external financial assets and liabilities sides. A positive NIIP thus means that a country is a net 
                                                          
 
5
 Share prices rose very fast in the east. Using a different base year gives very high growth rates for the east 
without changing the overall picture. 
19 
 
 
lender, a negative one that it is a net borrower. Note that here we are comparing changes in the 
NIIP, rather than the level of NIIP itself, so we are looking at whether countries improved or 
worsened their net investment position. While thanks to Germany the North has a positive, modest 
increase in the NIIP, both southern as well as eastern countries worsened their net investment 
position.  
 
Table 1. Changes in financialisation, 2000-08 
 North South East 
∆ household debt 
(%GDP) 9.7 45.9 20.3 
∆ private credit 
(%GDP) 21.9 69.8 14.4 
real house prices, 
growth (00-07) 2.1 41.7  
real stock prices, 
growth (00-07) 5% 0% 66% 
∆ net international 
investment position 
(NIIP) (GDP %-pts) 16.4 -44.7 -30.8 
∆ denotes change. Household debt: Ireland, Slovenia 2001-08 Private credit: no data for SLV; 
house prices: no data for HUN, POL, SLV, SVK, PRT  
Source: GDP deflator: OECD; stock prices: IMF; private debt, NIIP: WDI; household debt, house 
prices: Eurostat 
 
 
According to this data overall the North experienced only a weak form of financialisation, with 
household debt and house prices only growing at comparatively weak rates. The South, experienced 
financialisation with a strong increase in household debt, private credit and house prices, and a 
worsening net investment position. Eastern countries had an intermediate form of financialisation 
with household debt increasing (in % of GDP) more than in the North but less than in the South. Its 
net investment position worsened. The eastern group is the only one that experienced a stock 
market boom, increasing by two thirds in the respective time period.  
To investigate whether the countries in our groupings exhibit similar trends Table 2 shows the 
changes in household debt from 2000 to 2008 in percentage points of GDP by country. Similar tables 
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for the other indicators in Table 1 can be found in the appendix. Household debt declined in 
Germany (by 11.7%-pts), it increased by modest 7.9%pts in Austria. The Netherlands stand out 
among the North with an increase of 32.8%-pts. The eastern countries mostly have double-digit 
increases, Slovenia with 9.4 %-pts. and the Czech Republic with 11.7%-pts have moderate increases 
and Hungary (30.5), Poland (24.5) and Slovakia (25.6) had strong increases. For comparison, the USA 
which is often regarded as the main example of a debt-led growth model had an increase of 26.1%-
pts over the same period. Most of the countries of the South are above that level. Ireland has a 
spectacular 114.3%-pts increase, but Greece (35.5), Spain (33.8) and Portugal (27.4) are also above 
US increases. Only Italy at 18.4 is below that. Two countries do not neatly conform to our scheme. 
The Netherlands have a high increase and Italy does have a substantial increase, but clearly lower 
than other countries of the South. 
 
Table 2. Increase in Household debt, 2000-08 (in % GDP) 
North South East 
Austria  
7.9 
Greece  
35.5 
Czech 
Republic  11.7 
Germany  11.7 Ireland  114 Hungary  30.5 
Netherlands  32.8 Italy  18.3 Poland  24.5 
   Portugal  27.4 Slovenia  9.4 
   Spain  33.8 Slovakia  25.6 
mean 9.7 mean 45.9 mean 20.3 
Note: Ireland, Slovenia 2001-08 
Sources: Eurostat 
 
6.2. Industrial Upgrading 
Table 3 summarises data concerning industrial upgrading in Europe. Real GDP per worker shows an 
11% increase in the North, a 7% rise in the South and a 33% increase in the East. The development in 
the South is somewhat heterogeneous with, Greece showing a 16% increase, but Spain only 4% and 
Italy 1% (see Table 4). The manufacturing share of value added as a percentage of GDP is used as a 
proxy for the degree of industrialisation. There is a general trend towards de-industrialisation across 
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Europe. Remarkably, the North is stable with a loss of less than one percentage point of the 
manufacturing share in GDP. The southern countries showed strong decline in manufacturing (-5.2%-
pts) and the East a moderate decline (-1.8%-pts). In terms of net FDI flows the East experienced an 
increase of 9.1 %-pts of GDP.6 Conversely, the North had strong FDI outflows (the net FDI position 
changed by -7.7 %-pts of GDP). This points to a polarisation between a Northern European core 
exporting FDI to the Eastern periphery. In the South the situation is mixed: on average the group 
shows a strong increased in the FDI position (+19.1%-pts) but this is entirely due to Ireland. The 
other southern countries experienced stable or declining net FDI inflows.  
Table 3. Industrial upgrading, 2000-08 
 North South East 
Productivity (GDP per 
worker), growth 11% 7% 33% 
∆ Manufacturing share 
(%GDP)  -0.8 -5.2 -1.8 
∆ Inward net FDI /GDP 
(% points) -7.7 19.1 9.1 
∆ Inward FDI 
liabilities/total 
liabilities (% points) 4 -3.7 11.6 
Current account 2000-
07 (% GDP) 3.7 -5.3 -4.7 
Note: Manufacturing share: no data for UK; FDI: HUN, SLV, GRE 2001-08, Source: OECD  
 
A sharp contrast between the South and the East becomes clear when looking at the ratio of FDI 
liabilities to total liabilities. This indicator captures the evolution of the quality of financial inflows. It 
shows that the East clearly has experienced a big increase in FDI liabilities (11.6%-pts) as share of 
total liabilities, confirming a dynamic of modernisation of goods and service provisions thanks to 
                                                          
 
6
 One of the limitation of FDI inflows as an indicator of industrial upgrading is that it also includes FDI 
in non-tradable services activities. This is important as financial services, real estate and trade 
accounted for an important share of FDI inflows to Eastern Europe (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2012, p. 
280-282; Vliegenthart, 2010). 
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foreign investment, whereas the South faced a decrease (-3.7%-pts) which presumably reflects a rise 
in debt and portfolio liabilities related to asset and real estate transactions. The North saw an 
increase of the ratio by 4%-pts. The North has had substantial current account surpluses in the 
decade prior to the crisis, where the South and the East had, on average substantial deficits (-5.3 and 
-4.7 respectively). The North and the South fit the post-Keynesian distinction of export-driven and 
debt-driven growth models well; the East would be an intermediate case. 
Tables 4 and 5 allow to assess if countries in our groups exhibit similar trends in terms of upgrading. 
Concerning productivity growth, the East experienced growth above 27% in all countries. The 
productivity growth was between 8.8% and 11.8% in the North, with Germany being the lowest at 
8.8%. In the South, the growth was much lower, ranging from in Italy (1.3%), Spain (3.9%) and 
Portugal (5.7%) and slightly higher in Ireland (9.5%). Only Greece (16.2%) had productivity growth 
above Nordic rates.  
 
Table 4. Productivity growth, 2000-08 (in %) 
North South East 
Austria  
11.8 
Greece  
16.2 
Czech 
Republic  33 
Germany  8.8 Ireland  9.5 Hungary  31.5 
Netherlands  11.7 Italy  1.3 Poland  28.1 
   Portugal  5.7 Slovenia  27.6 
   Spain  3.9 Slovakia  44.9 
mean 10.8 mean 7.3 mean 33 
Note: productivity growth is real GDP per FTE employee 
Source: AMECO 
 
The variation of the share of FDI liabilities over total liabilities shows a sharp contrast for most of the 
countries between the East and the South. All Eastern countries except Slovenia experienced a 
strong increase in FDI inflows relative to other capital inflows. In the South all countries experienced 
a decline of FDI in capital inflows, which was particularly pronounced in Ireland. Only in Italy did the 
FDI share grow moderately (+2.7 %). The dynamics within the North are quite heterogeneous. In 
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Austria, the share of FDI grew rapidly which probably reflect a limited opening to portfolio 
investment while in Germany it diminishes moderately and in Netherlands it stayed stable.  
Table 5. Change in inward FDI liabilities/total liabilities (% points) 
North South East 
Austria  
14.8 
Greece  
-4.9 
Czech 
Republic  8.2 
Germany  -2.4 Ireland  -13.7 Hungary  19.6 
Netherlands  0.2 Italy  2.7 Poland  10.8 
   Portugal  -1 Slovenia  -2.8 
   Spain  -1.4 Slovakia  22.1 
mean 4 mean -3.7 mean 11.6 
Source: Lane, Milesi & Ferretti (2007) 
 
The northern countries consolidated their industrial position. They experienced a rise in productivity, 
paired with a very small decline in industrialisation and a rise in FDI received. Interestingly they also 
experienced at the same time a reinforcement of their position of FDI net exporter and higher 
current accounts surpluses. In contrast, the current account position of both East and South 
deteriorated over the same period. However, the underlying dynamic is very different in each group. 
Productivity in the East rose strongly, while de-industrialisation was moderate and FDI experienced a 
very high increase in terms of GDP as well as in terms of stock of capital liabilities, contributing to the 
modernisation of the productive apparatus. Southern countries had lower increases in productivity, 
and a stronger de-industrialisation. Their FDI performance was also weaker in terms of GDP share 
and even deteriorates in terms total liabilities.  
 
6.3. Working class restructuring 
Table 6 provides an overview about the different developments of intra-working class relations 
across Europe. Northern countries experienced only low growth in real wages of 5.8% over the 
observed decade, with an increase of just 2% in Germany. Southern countries on average 
experienced a stronger increase in real wages at 7.6%, although the respective countries’ individual 
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development was more heterogeneous, with Greece’s and Ireland’s real wage growth around 16% 
and 17% being well above average. Eastern countries had the biggest rise in real wages by far, 
amounting to 30% on average. Poland, the country with the lowest increase in this group, had an 
increase of 13%. Regarding nominal wage growth, the differences across country groups are more 
pronounced, with a growth of 23%, 37% and 70% for North, South and East respectively. Wage 
dispersion is measured by the variation coefficient of sectoral wages. It is computed as the standard 
deviation of labour costs per employee of all sectors, 7 divided by the labour costs per employee of 
the total economy. An increase in the wage dispersion thus represents an increase in income 
inequality. Northern wage incomes clearly show the highest increase in inequality, with an increase 
of 6.9%, while the increase in inequality was much less in the South, where wage dispersion 
increased by 2.1%. The East experienced an increase of 4.8%. We use the ratio of social expenditures 
to GDP as a proxy for the welfare state. This ratio is practically stable (+0.2%-pts.) in the North. 
Southern countries experienced an expansion of the welfare state with an increase of 3.9%-pts, 
while in the East, social expenditures did shrink relative to GDP (-1%-pt). Union density declines in 
the North by 5.7%-pts, by 2.7%-pts. in the South and by 9.46%-pts in the East.  
  
                                                          
 
7 The sectors used are listed in Table A.15 in the Appendix 
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Table 6. Changes in working class coherence 
 North South East 
Real wages (Full time 
equivalent), growth 5.8% 7.6% 29.8% 
Nominal wages, 
growth 23% 37% 70% 
∆ Wage dispersion 6.9% 2.1% 4.8% 
∆ Social expenditures 
(in % of GDP) 0.2 3.9 -1.0 
∆ Union density -5.7 -2.7 -9.5 
Notes: real wages: no data for SLV;  wage dispersion: no data for NLD, POL, HUN, PRT; union density: 
SLV 2001-08; Wage dispersion is measured by the variation coefficient of sectoral wages 
Source: OECD 
 
Table 7 presents results for wage dispersion by country. Unfortunately data availability is very 
uneven. Only Austria, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and 
Slovakia have data for the full 2000-08 period. Only these countries are included in the calculation of 
the mean for country groups. The South has had a mixed experience with decreases in wage 
dispersion in Spain and Italy, but increases in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. In the North and East all 
countries apart from the Netherlands experienced increases, with Slovakia, Czech Republic, Austria 
and Germany showing particularly high values. The experience in the East and North seems similar 
and distinct from the South. 
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Table 7. Change in wage dispersion 2000-2008  
North South East 
Austria  
8.7 
Greece  
5.2 
Czech 
Republic  4.3 
Germany  
4.8 
Ireland  
4 
Hungary 
(2000-06) 2.6 
Netherlands 
(2001-08) -0.04 
Italy  
-0.7 
Poland (2000-
07) 2.1 
  
 
Portugal 
(2000-04) 5.2 
Slovenia  
2.4 
   Spain  -0.3 Slovakia  7.8 
Mean (2000-
08) 6.9 
mean(2000-
08) 2.1 
mean(2000-
08) 4.8 
Notes: Wage dispersion is measured by the variation coefficient of sectoral wages; mean includes 
only those countries where data is available for the full period (North: AUT, GER; South: GRC, IRE, 
ITA, ESP; East: CZR, SLV, SLK)  
Sources: OECD 
 
Table 8 gives the changes in social expenditures as % of GDP by country.  Germany experienced a 
decline of the social expenditures (relative to GDP) by 1.6%-pts, whereas Austria had a marginal 
increase (+0.1%-pt). The Netherlands, again, are an outlier within the group of the North, with social 
expenditures increasing by 2.1%-pts. All countries of the East, except for Hungary, experienced 
declines of the social expenditures relative to GDP. These declines range from -0.8 in the Czech 
Republic to -3.4%-pts in Slovakia. Hungary had a substantial increase of 3.4%-pts. In the South we 
consistently see substantial increases. Ireland stands out with an increase of 8.3%-pts. The other 
countries are in the range between 2.1%-pts (Spain) to 3.4%-pts (Portugal). With the exception of 
Hungary, the countries thus do fit our country groupings quite well. 
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Table 8. Changes in social protection in % of GDP 2000-2008 
North South East 
Austria  
0.1 
Greece  
2.8 
Czech 
Republic  -0.8 
Germany  -1.6 Ireland  8.3 Hungary  2.9 
Netherlands  2.1 Italy  3.1 Poland  -1.1 
   Portugal  3.4 Slovenia  -2.8 
   Spain  2.1 Slovakia  -3.4 
Mean 0.2 mean 3.9 mean -1.0 
Social protection is measured by expenditures on social protection as % of GDP. 
Source: OECD 
 
 
Overall, the North shows a picture of working class retreat with a low increase in wages and a strong 
increase in wage inequality and a pronounced decline in union density, while the welfare state has 
remained stable in size. In the South labour experienced a moderately higher increase in wages, but 
this was more evenly spread among the working class with wage dispersion almost stable. At the 
same time there is consolidation of the welfare state and it has the most moderate decline in union 
density. Eastern countries show an uneven picture. They experienced a very high increase in wages, 
while at the same time having the strongest increase in wage income inequality, a sharp decline in 
union density and a shrinking size of the welfare state.  
 
7. Discussion 
This paper put forward the hypothesis that already during the boom preceding the Euro crisis there 
has been a divergence in working class experiences across Europe. We suggest grouping European 
countries into groups of the North, the South and the East and find that countries had different 
experiences in terms of their growth driver, in terms of the degree of financialisation they 
experienced and how their working classes fared.  
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The northern growth model starts from a high level of development. It developed an export 
orientation and, with the exception of the Netherlands, relatively weak dynamics of financialisation. 
It maintained its industrial sector and experienced solid productivity growth. With the exception of 
the Netherlands the increase in household debt and in property prices was low. While real wages 
grew moderately, wage dispersion grew substantially and union density declined. This is a case of a 
retreat of labour (in Germany more so than in other northern countries). 
The southern countries experienced a strong wave of financialisation with sharply increasing levels 
of household debt and a property price boom. This resulted in moderately high levels of growth, but 
at the same time an accelerated de-industrialisation. Real wage growth was moderate and wage 
dispersion was comparatively stable. Union density declined, but substantially less than in other 
country groups and the size of the welfare state increased relative to GDP. The financial bubble was 
used to generate improvements for the working classes that went beyond better access to credit. 
We call this a social compromise backed by financialisation. It is instructive to contrast this with the 
experience of the Anglo-Saxon countries. In the latter there was a much more pronounced increase 
in wage inequality and a weaker real wage growth. There was also more welfare state retrenchment. 
We would refer to the Anglo-Saxon constellation as hegemony by financialisation as it does not 
contain genuine working class improvement. 
The Eastern countries experienced a strong industrial upgrading and a medium wave of 
financialisation. This had contradictory effects on the working classes: while real wages grew much 
faster than in other countries, it also experienced an increase in wage dispersion and it suffered a 
decline in welfare expenditures and sharp decline in union density. We call this disintegration of the 
working class coherence hegemony by catching up. High productivity gains allowed rising living 
standards while most other indicators of working class conditions deteriorated sharply. 
We think that our country groups do capture important differences in the dynamics across countries. 
For most indicators the variation across groups is larger than within groups. In this sense our groups 
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are useful. However, there is a substantial amount of variation across countries that cannot be easily 
reduced to our groupings. For example, Germany is an extreme case of what we refer to as northern 
model, whereas the Netherlands has some characteristics similar to the hegemony by finance 
model, in particular a strong increase is household debt and slightly expanding social expenditures.  
Our main finding is that the divergence of working class experience across European countries is not 
merely a result of the different economic performance during the Euro crisis, but pre-dates it. 
Indeed the decade from the introduction of the Euro to the crisis affected working classes in quite 
different ways: while there was an erosion of working class cohesion in the northern countries, the 
boom of in the southern countries also allowed for a consolidation of the welfare state and came 
with relatively little increase in wage dispersion. The East experienced an erosion of working class 
cohesion (decline in union density, increase in wage differentials) while at the same time 
experiencing a strong increase in real wages. Working classes in these three country groups also 
have different degrees of financialisation. 
Let us compare our argument to that in the economic geography and VoC. As regards economic 
geography there is a difference in the framework, but a compementarity in the findings. Fingleton et 
al (2015) take the OCA theory and its criticism as their theoretical reference point. OCA asks whether 
given initial disparities across regions or countries there will be convergence and how regions will 
react to asymmetric shocks. However, OCA does not offer a theory of these shocks and the financial 
crisis 2008 and the Euro crisis that followed thereafter are thus essentially treated as exogenous 
shocks. Our approach highlights the endogenous forces, such as financialisation and current account 
imbalances, that gave rise to the crisis, but our analysis does imply the same picture of observed 
income convergence prior to the crisis, while instability was increasing. Our approach does give 
primacy to national over regional factors, however this does not mean that it is inconsistent with the 
economic geography approach. First, we argue that in the relevant period, i.e. the decade before the 
crisis, national forces were relatively more powerful than regional divergence forces in driving 
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economic developments. This is a historically specific statement, that need not hold in other periods. 
Second, our reading of the available evidence from economic geography is that is consistent with 
our argument. Fingleton et al (2015) do report convergence across European regions until the crisis 
and a divergence thereafter. This divergence has very strong national pattern (see Fingleton et al’s 
Figure 11). 
As regards VoC, there are differences in the analytical framework and some agreements as well as 
some disagreements regarding the assessment of the pre-crisis period. While VoC requires internal 
coherence and external competitiveness for a viable model our grouping makes no claim of 
generalised validity and internal coherence. In contrast, we regard the debt-driven and export-
driven growth models as unstable in the longer term. There is no requirement of a competitive 
performance, but we do analyse the growth regime. We use country groups that are almost identical 
to those used by recent VoC literature, but for different reasons: VoC describes models of capitalism, 
we summarise potentially unstable development trajectories. VoC regards labour relations as the 
key institutional structure that shapes models of capitalism, whereas we highlight that 
financialisation has played the key role the South and we interpret labour relations as the outcome 
of class compromises rather than efficient institutions.   
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has a contribution both at the theoretical and at the empirical level. We have suggested 
IPKPE, which offers a fusion of PK macroeconomics, neo-Gramscian understanding of class conflict 
and forces of divergences that draw on selected analyses in economic geography. IPKPE can be 
subsumed under the variegated capitalism approach, but has a stronger PK element. We have 
offered an analysis that highlights the importance of the nation state as locus of institutionalised 
class compromises and of demand regimes. This does allow for sub-national as well as super-
31 
 
 
national forces of development, but we argue that in the pre-crisis decade the national forces were 
stronger. 
Our macroeconomic analysis of the North and South incorporates and extends those of Hein (2013) 
and Stockhammer (2011, 2016b), but we go beyond their analysis in that we also cover Eastern 
Europe and that we highlight the close link between growth models and working class restructuring. 
Our approach builds on NGIPE, but we have a greater concern for demand formation and focus more 
on the (fragile) complementarity of the diverse accumulation regimes than on the dynamic of 
European integration as such. There is a substantial overlap with the analyses by Nölke and 
Vliegenthart (2009) and by the regulationists (Boyer, 2013; Mazier and Petit, 2013). We are even 
closer to Becker and Jäger (2012) and Heyes et al (2012), but our main contribution is a more 
comprehensive empirical analysis in identifying one export-driven model at the core and two 
dependent models: an Eastern model of subordinate catching up and a Southern one with debt-
driven growth. Our empirical analysis has served to illustrate how the IPKPE can be fruitfully applied 
and has provided a richer and more comprehensive analysis than the comparable literature. 
However, it clearly needs further refinement and raises several questions for future research. First, 
in terms the foundations of the analysis, a more precise formulation of the notion that different 
dimensions have been key for the overall dynamics in different country groups is required. Second, 
our analysis is based on the premise that these three growth models are complementary. Given that 
we reject competitiveness as the benchmark for performance, the conditions under which demand 
regimes are complementary need to be clarified. Finally, this paper has focussed on developments in 
Europe, but the IPKPE approach would require an extension to include the USA and the global South. 
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Appendix. Country experiences 
Table A.1. Absolute change in %GDP of Domestic credit to private sector 2000-2008 
North South East 
Austria  
17.7 
Greece  
50.0 
Czech 
Republic  3.3 
Germany  -10.8 Ireland  117.0 Hungary  37.3 
Netherlands  59 Italy  29.2 Poland  23.1 
   Portugal  47.4 Slovenia   
   Spain  105.1 Slovakia  -6.1 
mean 21.9 mean 69.8 mean 14.4 
Sources: WDI 
 
Table A.2. Growth of domestic credit to private sector 2000-2008 
North South East 
Austria  
0.2 
Greece  
1.1 
Czech 
Republic  0.1 
Germany  -0.1 Ireland  1.1 Hungary  1.2 
Netherlands  0.4 Italy  0.4 Poland  0.9 
   Portugal  0.4 Slovenia   
   Spain  1.1 Slovakia  -0.1 
mean 0.2 mean 0.8 mean 0.5 
no data for SLV 
Sources: WDI 
 
Table A.3. Growth of real house prices 2000-2008 (in %) 
North South East 
Austria  
-1.6 
Greece  
48.9 
Czech 
Republic  66.8 
Germany  -13.2 Ireland  49.3 Hungary   
Netherlands  21 Italy  33.1 Poland   
   Portugal  -8.8 Slovenia   
   Spain  85.9 Slovakia   
mean 2.1 mean 41.7 mean  
Notes: no data for, HUN, POL, SLV, SVK, PRT 
Sources: Eurostat 
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Table A.4. Growth of real share prices 2000-2007 (in%, relative to 2007) 
North South East 
Austria  -6 Greece  -5 Czech Republic  64 
Germany  73 Ireland  21 Hungary  50 
Netherlands  -52 Italy  -18 Poland  62 
   Portugal  -17 Slovenia  81 
   Spain  20 Slovakia  75 
mean 5 mean 0.3 mean 66 
Sources: IMF (share prices), OECD (GDP deflator) 
 
Table A.5. Absolute change in Net international investment position in % of GDP  
North South East 
Austria  7.6 Greece  -36.7 Czech Republic  -31.6 
Germany  22.2 Ireland  -67.7 Hungary  -33.4 
Netherlands  19.4 Italy  -16.9 Poland  -25.6 
   Portugal  -55 Slovenia  -22.2 
   Spain  -47.3 Slovakia  -41.1 
mean 16.4 mean -44.72 mean 30.8 
Sources: WDI 
 
Table A.6. Productivity growth 2000-08 (in %) 
North South East 
Austria  11.8 Greece  16.2 Czech Republic  33 
Germany  8.8 Ireland  9.5 Hungary  31.5 
Netherlands  11.7 Italy  1.3 Poland  28.1 
   Portugal  5.7 Slovenia  27.6 
   Spain  3.9 Slovakia  44.9 
mean 10.8 mean 7.3 mean 33.0 
productivity growth is real GDP per full time-equivalent (FTE) employee 
Sources: AMECO 
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Table A.7. Change in manufacturing share, value added (% of GDP) 2000-2008 
North South East 
Austria  -0.1 Greece   Czech Republic  -2.2 
Germany  -0.4 Ireland  -10.6 Hungary  -1.7 
Netherlands  -1.8 Italy  -3 Poland  0.1 
   Portugal  -3.3 Slovenia  -3.6 
   Spain  -4.2 Slovakia  -1.6 
mean -0.8 mean -5.2 mean -1.8 
no data for Greece 
Sources: OECD 
 
Table A.8. Change of FDI inward stock (%GDP), 2001-08 
North South East 
Austria 21.9 Greece 1.1 Czech Republic 15.6 
Germany  1.9 Ireland -47.0 Hungary 5.8 
Netherlands 15.3 Italy 4.9 Poland 12.4 
    Portugal 14.8 Slovenia 34.2 
    Spain 12.2 Slovakia 17.1 
mean 13.0 mean -2.8 mean 17.0 
HUN, SLV, GRE 2001-08 
Source: OECD 
 
Table A.9. ∆ Inward net FDI /GDP, 2000-08 
North South East 
Austria  -3.7 Greece  -4.9 Czech Republic  9.1 
Germany  -7.6 Ireland  115.2 Hungary  -2.9 
Netherlands  -11.9 Italy -12.8 Poland  7.1 
   Portugal  -7.1 Slovenia  1.8 
   Spain  -8.8 Slovakia  30.5 
mean -7.7 mean 19.2 mean 9.1  
Source: Lane, Milesi & Ferretti (2007) 
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Table A.10. ∆ Inward FDI liabilities/total liabilities, 2000-08 
North South East 
Austria  
14.1 
Greece  
-4.9 
Czech 
Republic  8.2 
Germany  -2.4 Ireland  -13.7 Hungary  19.6 
Netherlands  0.2 Italy 2.7 Poland  10.8 
   Portugal  -1 Slovenia  -2.8 
   Spain  -1.4 Slovakia  22.1 
mean 4 mean -3.7 mean 11.6  
Source: Lane, Milesi & Ferretti (2007) 
 
  Table A.11. Current account 2000-07 (% GDP) 
North South East 
Austria  1.7 Greece  -8.5 Czech Republic  -4.3 
Germany  3.8 Ireland  -2.1 Hungary  -7.4 
Netherlands  5.6 Italy  -1.3 Poland  -3.4 
   Portugal  -8.9 Slovenia  -1.7 
   Spain  -5.8 Slovakia  -6.9 
mean 3.7 mean -5.3 mean -4.7 
Sources: OECD 
 
Table A.12. Real wage growth 2000-2008 
North South East 
Austria  8% Greece  15.7% Czech Republic  39.6% 
Germany  2.2% Ireland  16.7% Hungary  39% 
Netherlands  7.3% Italy  1.9% Poland  12.7% 
   Portugal  2% Slovenia  -1.7 
   Spain  1.7% Slovakia  28.1% 
mean 5.8% mean 7.6% mean 29.8% 
No data for SLV 
Sources: OECD 
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  Table A.13. Nominal wage growth  2000-2008 
North South East 
Austria  26% Greece  49% Czech Republic  67% 
Germany  15% Ireland  51% Hungary  114% 
Netherlands  28% Italy  25% Poland  38% 
   Portugal  28% Slovenia  48% 
   Spain  32% Slovakia  84% 
mean 23% mean 37% mean 70% 
Notes: SLV 2002-2008 
Sources: OECD 
 
Table A.14. Change in Union density, 2000-08 (%-pts) 
North South East 
Austria  
-7.6 
Greece  
-2.5 
Czech 
Republic  -9.8 
Germany  -5.4 Ireland  -6.1 Hungary  -4.9 
Netherlands  -4.1 Italy  -1.4 Poland  -2.1 
   Portugal  -1.2 Slovenia  -15.5 
   Spain  -2.1 Slovakia  -15.1 
mean -5.7 mean -2.7 mean -9.5 
Notes: SLV 2001-08 
Sources: OECD 
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Table A.15. Economic Sectors for calculation of wage dispersion 
C01T02 Agriculture, hunting and forestry 
C05 Fishing, fish hatcheries, fish farms and related services 
C10T12 Mining and quarrying of energy producing materials 
C13T14 Mining and quarrying except energy producing materials 
C15T16 Food products, beverages and tobacco 
C17T19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 
C20 Wood and products of wood and cork 
C21T22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 
C23T25 Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products 
C26 Other non-metallic mineral products 
C27T28 Basic metals and fabricated metal products 
C29T33 Machinery and equipment 
C34T35 Transport equipment 
C36T37 Manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling 
C40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 
C41 Collection, purification and distribution of water 
C45 CONSTRUCTION 
C50T52 Wholesale and retail trade - repairs 
C55 Hotels and restaurants 
C60T63 Transport and storage 
C64 Post and telecommunications 
C65T67 Financial intermediation 
C70T74 Real estate, renting and business activities 
C75 Public admin. and defence - compulsory social security 
C80 Education 
C85 Health and social work 
C90T93 Other community, social and personal services 
 Note: This table lists the sector used in the calculation of wage dispersion. Where one or more sub-
sectors were missing, we use the next higher sectoral level instead. Thus the following changes were 
made: Ireland: C01T05 instead of C01 T02 and 05, C40T41 instead of C40 and 41, C60T64 instead of 
C60T63 and 64; Italy: C40T41 instead of C40 and 41. 
 
 
 
